By the name `E-il Sha-dai: The purport of the verse is that He appeared to the patriarchs by this name [E-il Sha-dai], which indicates that He is the victor [and prevailer] over the hosts of heaven, doing great miracles for them except that no change from the natural order of the world was noticeable … It is not [in nature] that man should be rewarded for performance of a commandment or punished for committing a transgression but by a miracle. If man were left to his nature or his fortune, his deeds would neither add to him nor diminish from him. Rather, reward and punishment in this world, as mentioned in the entire scope of the Torah, are all miracles, but they are hidden. They appear to the onlooker as being part of the natural order of things, but in truth they come upon man as punishment and reward [for his deeds]. It is for this reason that the Torah speaks at great length of the assurances concerning this world, and does not explain the assurances of the soul in "the World of Souls." These [assurances mentioned in the Torah as recompense for the observance or transgression of the Divine Commandments] are wonders which go contrary to nature, while the existence of the soul [after the death of the body]and its cleaving unto G-d are the proper way inherent in its nature that she returneth unto G-d Who gave it (Chavel, 1973, 65- 66).

It seems that, according to Nahmanides, free will is not manifested by mans' actions, for, as he comments on the story of Joseph, sent by his father to meet his brothers, "the decree is truth, and diligence is falsehood." Mans' actions are influenced by a master plan, and are not governed by his own free will. Mans' will only has jurisdiction over meaning, found in the depths of the Self, in the quality of the subject . Thus, choice is the ability to give either positive or negative meaning to one's actions, the choice "to intend" with quality.

This division between Being and Doing, which relegates free will to the category of Being, and distances it from the world of practice, raises the question: When did the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, and the nullification of his free will, take place? The Bible reports that Pharaoh "refused to send the people;" was it really within his power to send the nation or prevent it from going? For, as we have just established, free choice does not play a role in the realm of action, not for Pharaoh and not for any individual; as for the righteous, apparently, so for the wicked, according to Nahmanides. On the plane of mechanistic intentionality (as opposed to that of quality intentionality), free choice does not play a role. If so, why was it taken away from Pharaoh?

The Heart Follows the Actions

In transferring choice from the category of Doing to that of Being, the bilateral influences between intention and action are not disrupted, rather those relationships between reward and punishment -- directly in the world to come, and hidden behind the veil of nature in this world -- are. The connection between Doing and Being is organic, and can not be interfered with. Following the rule of "the heart follows the actions" and its corollary, the actions influence the quality of the intention, and, conversely, of course, the intentions influence and establish behavior. From this, it is clear that according to Nahmanides, the will, which resides in the internal quality and directly guides the intention, also indirectly influences praxis. Thus, according to Nahmanides' approach, the hardening of Pharaoh's heart seems to be the unnatural placement of a "shield" which interrupts the bilateral flow of influence between Doing and Being. Paradoxically, on the one hand, Pharaoh's behavior is not ruled by his evil intention; however, on the other hand, even if he chooses to change his evil intent to a righteous one, he cannot better his actions. In other words, Pharaoh is taken out of the picture, his status, for better or worse, no longer effects the divine decree to save Israel.

Indeed, the purpose of the ten plagues is encapsulized by the phrase,"to take out the prisoners with distaffs," in the words of the saintly Or HaHaim, tears for the Egyptians and songs for the Jews. Or to put it more bluntly, the plagues had really been intended for the benefit of the Jews, to open their eyes to G-d's rule, to enable their belief in Him, and more crucially, to open their hearts to His involvement in their affairs, an involvement where divine providence replaces free will - a concept, which as I have noted above, is difficult for man, who has apparently been forced to give up on his autonomy, to accept.

In light of this revolutionary change in G-d's rule of the world, where free will's role has been minimized in order to maximize divine providence's, we must consider the injury done to Pharaoh's free will. Apparently, the ousting of free will from its position of direct influence on the realm of action, on Doing, was not absolute. The cybernetic cycle which characterizes human existence both sandwiches and weaves together all the elements of personality one dependant upon the other without division between them. Thus, we should not differentiate between the realms of quality intentionality, where quality creates meaning, and the realm of praxis. Doing so might place praxis in the hands of the blind, power-wielding, mechanistic system .

It is inconceivable to imagine such a situation occurring, even in Pharaoh's case. In the case of any other mortal, the internal quality would still penetrate into the world of action by way of the power of free will, left in its control, and by way of those additional reserves of free will granted to it, after it was uprooted from the world of praxis. The choice of this quality would of course indirectly influence actions. Thus, the power of free will is preserved as fundamental to man, determines man's behavior, be it harsh or kind, and, in the end, enables man to receive a heavenly response – in the form of reward or punishment!

Seemingly, the removal of Pharaoh's free will caused the cybernetic cycle to be interrupted so that the influence of the flow from the subject -- who chooses -- to the object -- which acts -- was stopped. In future studies (in the next parsha) we will witness, and perhaps even understand how the principle of reward and punishment functions in the framework of this new approach. The transfer of the `natural` divine providence to the level of this worldly reward and punishment, and the concomitant raising of free will to the level of divine-spiritual achievement, to the world of the souls, where it reaches its full force and splendor, highlights the low esteem with which free will is held in this world and the inferiority of the reward and punishment system which has apparently been placed in Nature's hands. According to Nahmanides divine providence has not been directly dependant on free will since G-d changed his method for ruling the world, from the emphasis on free will in the period of the patriarchs to the emphasis on divine providence in the period of the Exodus from Egypt.

Like Nahmanides, the saintly Or HaHaim also restricts the role of free will; however, he does this by transferring free will from the province of the good to that of the evil. For, as it is written, "from the Most High, evil will not come, only good;" "Since from the wicked ones will come forth the wickedness;" "May your evil rot." In this approach, it is a sign of G-d's kindness to the righteous that he guides them through divine providence, while the wicked remain under their own guidance under the aegis of free will. The principle "Everything is in the hands of heaven except for the fear of heaven" raises the question of exactly what free choice consists. Is the choice of "fearing heaven" itself placed in men's hands, or is it only the possibility of rejecting fear of heaven which is given to man?

Based upon the Or HaHaim's approach we must consider how reward and punishment function as a basis for G-d's rule given that, in a certain sense, punishment is not meted out by G-d; rather, it is meted out by man. For it is man's improper behavior, independent of G-d's intervention, which unleashes retribution. As well, given the Or HaHaim's approach, we must ask: Pharaoh, having chosen evil, should have lost the benefit of divine providence so what does the verse mean when it claims that G-d hardened Pharaoh's heart?

Perhaps, one benefit of following the Or HaHaim's approach is that even though in it HaKadosh Barukh Hu deals only with good, the fact remains that in weakening Pharoah's free will he freed him, if the truth be known, from the ability to do evil. But, if so, we must ask: Why was Pharoah punished with the ten plagues? Firstly, it seems from the Or HaHaim's writings that Pharoah's original choice to do evil – taken before Hashem took away his free will – was enough to justify his punishment. And secondly, the Or HaHaim emphasizes the dual nature of the ten plagues. They were sent not only to educate the Egyptians but also, and, even more crucially to show the children of Israel G-d's power over the forces of nature. Thus, although reward and punishment do find their proper place within the rubric of the ten plagues, the plagues are not to be understood primarily as retributive at all; rather, their objective lies far above the mundane computation of reward and punishment.

Translated by Rabbi Meshulam Gotlieb
www.MGtransEd.com